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INTRODUCTION 
The federal government and local governments have historically 
tied housing affordability requirements to subsidies designed to 
promote affordable housing development.  In the first half of the 20th 
century, the federal government promoted affordable housing 
development through the Public Housing program, which was 
publicly financed, owned, and managed.1  With the creation of the 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania, vreina@upenn.edu. The author 
would like to thank the Fordham Urban Law Journal for inviting him to be a part of 
the symposium and thorough review and editing, Claudia Aiken for her research 
assistance on this project, and Laura Abernathy, Andrew Aurand, Benjamin Keys, 
David Schleicher, and Jeff Lubell for their feedback on drafts of the paper. 
 1. According to the National Housing Law Project, “[t]he United States Housing 
Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437) established the public housing program, which 
1268 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the 
1960s, the federal government moved toward programs and incentives 
that promoted private sector ownership and management of 
subsidized affordable housing units.2  Through these programs, 
owners commit to maintaining affordable units for fixed periods of 
time in exchange for subsidies.3  But because some owners choose to 
exit private sector programs after the affordability restriction periods 
end, it remains unclear what the mandated length of these 
affordability restriction periods should be.4 
In light of recent housing affordability challenges, housing 
advocates have increased calls for “permanent affordability” 
requirements on housing developments that receive any form of 
public subsidy.5  Permanent affordability means mandating 
affordability restrictions on a property, or the land on which it is 
developed, that run in perpetuity — unless the governing agency 
agrees to release the property from its affordability contract.  This 
Article discusses the role and length of such affordability restrictions, 
 
produced nearly 1.4 million units nationwide.” See Public Housing, NAT’L HOUSING 
L. PROJECT, https://www.nhlp.org/resource-center/public-housing/ 
[https://perma.cc/YLB2-K6CL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 2. See generally JACLENE BEGLEY ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW 
YORK CITY’S SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: 2011 (2011), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/SHIPReportFinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4VP-VYAR]. The Furman Center found that one byproduct of 
this shift has been the continual loss of guaranteed affordable units to subsidy 
expirations. Id. at 9–10. Between 1962 and 2010, New York City lost over 62,000 units 
that had been subsidized through HUD financing and insurance, HUD project-based 
rental assistance, the Mitchell-Lama program, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits. 
Id. at 19. Going forward, this Article  uses “affordable housing” to refer to all units 
with below market-rate rents, which includes those with a subsidy. In addition, this 
Article uses “subsidized affordable housing” to refer to units with below market-rate 
rents due to a public subsidy and the accompanying affordability restriction tied to it. 
 3. See ALEX SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 203–26 (3d 
ed. 2015). 
 4. BEGLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 19. For a review of studies on the effects of 
affordability restrictions after the time periods elapsed, see Jake Blumgart, Have We 
Been Wasting Affordable Housing Money?, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://shelterforce.org/2016/02/04/have_we_been_wasting_affordable_housing_mone
y/ [https://perma.cc/RM2T-BJ8U]. 
 5. See generally BENJAMIN DULCHIN, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. DEV., 
PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS (2015), 
https://anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-Permanent-Affordability-Practical-
Solutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFF6-K9D5]. “Permanently affordable” housing is 
any housing that, when it receives a public subsidy or tax incentives, or is built using 
public land, must maintain affordable rents or homeownership for the full duration of 
its existence. See, e.g., id. at 4. 
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and the potential benefits and challenges associated with mandating 
permanent affordability. 
Part I of this Article outlines the current housing affordability 
problems.  Part II then describes where the preservation of subsidized 
affordable housing sits among other policy responses aimed at 
addressing current housing affordability problems.  Part III defines 
the concept of “permanent affordability” and Part IV highlights the 
opportunities and challenges associated with mandating it.  Finally, 
Part V explores the policy implications of a permanent affordability 
mandate, and Part VI concludes that permanent affordability 
mandates can be an effective tool in addressing housing affordability 
in some contexts. 
I. THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGE 
There is a plethora of research evaluating the scale and nature of 
the current national housing affordability problem.  Most of this 
research assesses the severity of housing cost burdens, which is the 
share of household income spent on housing.6   This research points to 
two distinct realities.  First, the level of rent burdens, particularly 
those faced by the lowest-income households, have escalated 
dramatically nationwide.7  Second, the existing inventory of housing 
affordable to the lowest-income households is small and shrinking.8 
 
 6. Rental Burdens: Rethinking Affordability Measures, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URBAN DEV., 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html 
[https://perma.cc/DAG2-TA8D] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). HUD defines rent-
burdened families as those “who pay more than 30 percent of their income for 
housing” and who may, as a result, “have difficulty affording necessities such as food, 
clothing, transportation, and medical care.” Id. 
 7. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 5 (2018), 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations
_Housing_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8QA-AXBE]. “The cost-burdened share of 
renters doubled from 23.8 percent in the 1960s to 47.5 percent in 2016 as housing 
costs and household incomes steadily diverged, with the largest increases occurring in 
the 2000s.” Id. 
 8. The Joint Center for Housing Studies found that “[t]he nation’s supply of low-
cost rental housing shrank significantly after the Great Recession and has remained 
essentially unchanged since 2015 . . . . [M]ore than 2.5 million units priced below $800 
in real terms — affordable to households earning up to $32,000 per year — were lost 
on net between 1990 and 2016.” Id. at 28. 
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In 2017, nearly 31% of all households and 46% of renter households 
spent over 30% of their income on rent.9 According to HUD, 
households that spend over 30% of their income on housing are 
housing cost burdened.10  The situation is far worse for low-income 
households.  In 2017, over 88% of U.S. renters with household 
incomes less than $20,000 were rent burdened, whereas only under 
1% of households in this bracket spent less than 20% of their income 
on rent.11  Further, nearly half of all renters suffer from excessive rent 
burdens.12  The impact of rent burden is not limited to a particular 
market, with households in both high-cost markets and relatively low-
cost markets carrying high levels of rent burden.13  Moreover, while 
the effects of rent burden are not new, research shows that between 
2000 and 2010, the extent of these burdens increased dramatically 
because increases in rent far outpaced income growth.14  By 2010, 
almost every Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) in the United 
States reported higher rent burdens than it had ten years earlier.15 
 
 9. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
(ACS) 1-YEAR ESTIMATES (2017), https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/data/summary-file.html [https://perma.cc/M888-L9YH]. 
 10. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN 
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME?: A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2007). 
 11. VINCENT REINA, UNIV. OF PA WHARTON PUB. POLICY INITIATIVE, THE U.S. 
NEEDS A NATIONAL VISION FOR HOUSING POLICY 64 (2019), 
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/314-a [https://perma.cc/BRX7-
U6XS]. 
 12. John Landis & Vincent Reina, Eleven Ways Demographic and Economic 
Change is Reframing American Housing Policy, 29 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 4, 12 
(2019). The American Housing Act of 1949 established 25% as the maximum share of 
their income that American households should pay for housing; this was raised to 
30% in 1973. Id. Any percentage in excess of 30% is deemed excess housing cost 
burden. Id. 
 13. In addition to high-rent states like California, New York, and Massachusetts, 
the list of states with the highest shares of excessively burdened renters includes less-
expensive states such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia. Id. The same is 
also true of metro areas: the list of metro areas with proportionally more cost-
burdened renters includes the usual suspects such as Los Angeles and Washington, 
D.C., but also less-expensive markets such as Orlando and Richmond. Id. 
 14. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., supra note 7, at 5. 
 15. See HEATHER L. SCHWARTZ ET AL., RAND CORP., PRESERVATION OF 
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING: EVALUATION OF THE MACARTHUR FOUNDATION’S 
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY INITIATIVE 112 (2016), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1444.html [https://perma.cc/8XBJ-
P582]. The authors found that between 1990 and 2010, rents increased across most of 
the 238 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. and that there was a dramatic increase 
in rent burdens for households below 80% of area median income. See id. at 13 
(noting that in the 1990s, rents were not rising but they did go up dramatically in 
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One of the key drivers of the current affordable housing crisis is 
the lack of supply of lower-cost housing units.  Across the United 
States, there are only 37 affordable housing units available for every 
100 extremely low-income renters.16  The lack of affordable units 
available to low-income renters is a national phenomenon.17  Every 
MSA in the country has fewer affordable rental units available than 
needed by extremely low-income households.18  A common argument 
against using housing cost burdens as the only measure of housing 
affordability is that people may choose to spend more on housing.19  
Another critique is that some of these rent burdens are driven by an 
issue with the sorting of units in most markets.  The sorting issue 
suggests that there are affordable units in a market but some low-
income households must rent a higher-cost unit, and thus experience 
housing cost burdens, because a comparatively higher-income 
household is renting the more affordable unit.  As a result, it is not 
that there is an insufficient number of units affordable to low-income 
households in many markets, it is just that some of those units are not 
available for low-income households to rent.  A report published by 
the RAND Corporation provided a hypothetical matching game to 
test the impact of sorting on rent burdens in housing markets.20  The 
RAND study ranked renters along the income distribution within 
their particular MSA, then ranked all rental units in that market by 
price, and finally matched each household to the rental unit that had 
the same rank in the distribution.21  The study found that even when 
 
subsequent decades). This resulted in higher levels of renter burden in almost every 
MSA in the study by 2010. Id. at 112. 
 16. See ANDREW AURAND, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: THE 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING SHORTAGE 3 (2019), 
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3K6F-HYU4]. “Extremely low income” is defined as income at or 
below the Federal Poverty Guideline or 30% of area median income, whichever is 
higher. Id. at 1. 
 17. Id. at 8. 
 18. The number of affordable and available units is as low as 14 for every 100 
extremely low-income households in the Las Vegas MSA. Id. The MSA with the 
largest number of units affordable and available to this population is Pittsburgh, 
which nevertheless has only 51 units for every 100 extremely low-income households. 
Id. 
 19. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN 
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME?: A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 2 (2008), 
https://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4L6-XZ8Y]. 
 20. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 15, at 9. 
 21. Id. 
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households sort themselves perfectly — meaning that if every 
household was ranked on the income distribution from lowest to 
highest, and if every rental unit was ranked from cheapest to most 
expensive, and subsequently matched based on that rank — the 
majority of low-income renters in almost every MSA in the country 
would be rent burdened.22 
The United States is losing more affordable rental units than those 
being produced, with or without a government subsidy, in any given 
year.23  This pattern will likely continue going forward considering the 
inadequate supply response to the demand for rental units in many 
markets.24  The lack of supply response is only increasing demand and 
prices throughout the rent distribution in many markets.25  A lack of 
filtering — meaning the most expensive units becoming more 
affordable over time as they depreciate26 — is contributing to the 
current affordability crisis.  Further, due to high demand and an 
inadequate supply response, some units may be “filtering  up” — 
meaning existing units are being upgraded, and prices are going up in 
units that would traditionally filter down.27  Meanwhile, units at the 
 
 22. Id. at 10. This study and similar studies highlight a lack of available and 
affordable units to low-income households across diverse housing markets. See 
generally NICHOLAS CHIUMENTI, THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING FOR THE EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME IN MASSACHUSETTS (2019); JOSH 
LEOPOLD ET AL., THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY GAP FOR EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME 
RENTERS IN 2013 (2015); MICH. STATE HOUS. DEV. AUTH., MICHIGAN STATEWIDE 
HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT 54–77 (2019), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mshda/MSHDA-Statewide-Housing-Needs-
web_653602_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNF8-UVP8]. 
 23. What Is Preservation?, NAT’L HOUSING TR., 
https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation [https://perma.cc/FEG7-
3KEL] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (noting that “for every new affordable apartment 
created, two are lost due to deterioration, abandonment or conversion to more 
expensive housing”). 
 24. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., supra note 7, at 5 (finding that even robust 
rental construction in recent years has not stemmed the loss of affordable rental 
units). Between 2006 and 2016, “the lowest-cost rental stock shrank by more than 10 
percent in 153 of the nation’s 381 metros and by more than 20 percent in 89 metros” 
as rental demand surged. Id.; see also Carolina K. Reid et al., Addressing California’s 
Housing Shortage: Lessons from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 241, 241 (2016) (finding that the lack of new 
construction in California helped push rents up 24 between 2000 and 2016). 
 25. Reid et al., supra note 24, at 241. According to this study, California has added 
half of the number of units needed over the last three decades, and the lack of new 
construction in California helped push rents up 24% between 2000 and 2016. Id. 
 26. For a full discussion of filtering, see George Gastler, William Grigsby and the 
Analysis of Housing Sub-Markets and Filtering, 33 URB. STUD. 1797 (1996). 
 27. See C. Tsuriel Somerville & Christopher J. Mayer, Government Regulation 
and Changes in the Affordable Housing Stock, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 45, 50 (2003); see 
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very bottom of the rent distribution traditionally exit the market due 
to depleted housing quality, which decreases the supply of the 
cheapest units.28  In theory, these units can be recapitalized and re-
enter the housing supply throughout the rent distribution, but there is 
clear evidence that this is not happening in many markets.29 
For example, in Philadelphia, over 7000 units of affordable housing 
exited the housing supply between 2014 and 2016 because their cost 
increased or because they dropped out of the housing stock entirely.30  
Meanwhile, the city added close to 3000 high-cost units.31  This loss of 
market-rate affordable housing increased both the number of rent-
burdened low-income households and the level of their rent 
burdens,32 and consequently increased demand for the remaining few 
subsidized affordable units in Philadelphia. 
 
also D.C. PRES. NETWORK, MAINTAINING ECONOMIC DIVERSITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY: A STRATEGY FOR PRESERVING AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2 (2014), 
https://www.neighborhoodindicators.org/sites/default/files/publications/preservation2
0strategy20dec20141.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VTU-3YQ9]. In hot markets like 
Washington, D.C., high demand for rental housing outstrips supply even at high 
income levels, causing competition and rising prices. Id. 
Over the last decade, DC has lost 50 percent of its low-cost housing units, 
largely due to rising housing prices . . . . [N]ew housing units are being 
snapped up as quickly as they are put on the market because the increased 
supply has not yet caught up to the elevated demand. 
Id. 
 28. MARK TRESKON & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., BUILDING AND PROTECTING 
AFFORDABLE AND ADEQUATE RENTAL HOUSING 4–5 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98718/building_and_protecting_a
ffordable_and_adequate_rental_housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/99CF-FYAX]. In weak 
markets like Detroit, the rental housing stock is under stress less because of demand 
than because of lack of capital for housing repairs, deterioration, and abandonment. 
Id. at 5. 
 29. Reid et al., supra note 24, at 241. 
 30. CITY OF PHILA., DEP’T OF PLANNING & DEV., HOUSING FOR EQUITY: AN 
ACTION PLAN FOR PHILADELPHIA 4 (2018) 
https://www.phila.gov/media/20190115161305/Housing-Action-Plan-Final-for-
Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8U7-FZ32] [hereinafter CITY OF PHILA., HOUSING FOR 
EQUITY]. According to this report, “low end” units were defined as those with rents 
at or below $800. Id. 
 31. Defined as those containing units with rents at or above $2000. Id. 
 32. CITY OF PHILA., DEP’T OF PLAN. & DEV., FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE: 
DEVELOPING PHILADELPHIA’S HOUSING ACTION PLAN 6 (2018) [hereinafter CITY OF 
PHILA., FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE], 
https://www.phila.gov/media/20190124094527/Foundation-for-the-Future-
Developing-the-HAP-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ2P-W8VB]. The combination of 
a dwindling supply of low-cost units and the stagnation of wages increases the ratio of 
rents to household incomes, resulting in rent burden among low-income households. 
1274 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
As demand for affordable housing has increased, new threats have 
emerged to the existing stock of subsidized affordable housing.  Many 
of the existing subsidized affordable housing units across the country 
will either reach the end of their affordability restriction periods, or 
require major recapitalization, over the coming decade.33  
Specifically: 
Over 590,000 units in Section 8 project-based rental assistance 
(PBRA) properties where an owner will have the option to renew 
their subsidy or exist the program; over 450,000 units in Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) properties; and 120,000 units in 
HOME-financed properties where the subsidy and affordability 
restrictions are due to expire over the next 10 years . . . . [M]any of 
these properties will renew the subsidy, apply for a new one, or 
maintain their units as affordable absent any subsidy.  How many 
units will remain affordable, and for how long, is unknown . . . . There 
are an additional 1 million LIHTC units approaching their 15-year 
disposition period over the next 10 years.  While their affordability 
restrictions do not expire, many of these units will need rehabilitation 
as part of a normal life-cycle recapitalization.34 
At the same time, publicly-owned affordable housing (“public 
housing”) is also at risk.  There is a consistent lack of adequate 
federal funding for necessary repairs, which leads to severe 
deterioration of units that affects the health and safety of tenants and 
can render some units uninhabitable.35  The national backlog for 
repairs is estimated to be well over $26 billion.36  At the local level, 
the consequences and effects of this backlog are well documented in 
the media.  A recent news article claimed that 2500 units in 
Washington D.C. — close to one-third of the city’s public housing 
portfolio — require “urgent” attention. 37  New York City’s public 
housing portfolio is also experiencing deteriorating conditions, which 
 
 33. Vincent Reina, The Preservation of Subsidized Housing: What We Know and 
Need to Know 1 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper, No. WP18VR1, 2018), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/reina_wp18vr1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2G9-U7LP]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. For a discussion of public housing’s severe capital needs, see SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 3, at 178–84 (2015). 
 36. Reina, supra note 33, at 4. 
 37. See Morgan Baskin, Nearly One-Third of the City’s Public Housing Stock is at 
Risk of Becoming Uninhabitable, WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 20, 2018, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing-
complex/article/21038117/nearly-onethird-of-the-citys-public-housing-stock-is-at-risk-
of-becoming-uninhabitable [https://perma.cc/QAC5-MMYT]. 
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has resulted in a multitude of health-related lawsuits.38  The scale of 
housing quality issues in public housing presents a challenge: 
policymakers will increasingly need to decide whether to use existing 
subsidies to develop new subsidized affordable housing or reinvest in 
the viability and affordability of existing subsidized housing. 
This Part has highlighted a potent affordable housing challenge.  
The question then becomes whether, when, and how a permanent 
affordability mandate would address some of the factors affecting 
housing affordability. 
II. POLICY RESPONSES 
The current affordability crisis requires a multi-pronged policy 
response.  Many researchers and practitioners agree that there is no 
one solution to the current challenges.39  Instead, a suite of responses 
must be adopted simultaneously.40  These responses often revolve 
around three main topics: (1) increasing the supply of housing, 
including those that are market rate and those that enter the market 
at a lower price point, and are thus affordable to low-income 
households; (2) preserving the supply and quality of existing 
affordable housing, including units with and without government 
subsidies; and (3) protecting low-income households from 
 
 38. There are various media reports about the housing conditions, with some 
specifically focusing on lead exposure. See, e.g., J. David Goodman et al., Tests Show 
Children Were Exposed to Lead. The Official Response: Challenge the Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/18/nyregion/nycha-lead-
paint.html [https://perma.cc/M5AT-F89H]. Others focus more broadly on issues of 
housing quality and inhabitability. See, e.g., Nicole Greenfield, Inside NYC’s Public 
Housing, Mold and Neglect Are a Dangerous Combo, NAT’L RESOURCE DEF. 
COUNCIL (June 25, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/inside-nycs-public-housing-
mold-and-neglect-are-dangerous-combo [https://perma.cc/5TYJ-EET2]. 
 39. See Emily Badger, How to Make Expensive Cities Affordable for Everyone 
Again, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/19/how-to-make-expensive-
cities-affordable-for-everyone-again [https://perma.cc/A42Y-C98L] (discussing the 
response of various economists, sociologists, and land-use scholars to the question of 
what happens to housing affordability when non-subsidized housing supply is 
increased). 
 40. See Jeffrey Lubell, Preserving and Expanding Affordability in Neighborhoods 
Experiencing Rising Rents and Property Values, 18 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 
131, 132 (2016) (highlighting the need for local governments to focus on six housing 
strategies: (1) preservation of existing affordable rental units; (2) protections that 
help long-term residents remain in place; (3) inclusive housing programs that 
promote mixed-income developments; (4) revenue generation from growth that gets 
repurposed as a resource for affordable housing; (5) incentives for affordable 
housing; and (6) the acquisition of existing affordable housing). 
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displacement.41  For policymakers, the necessary balance between 
new construction and preservation varies based on local market 
conditions.  For example, consider Philadelphia, which has an 
abundant supply of lower-cost units that are uninhabitable or in need 
of serious repair.  The city created a ten-year action plan to develop 
and preserve over 100,000 units of housing, with 63.5% of that target 
focused on the preservation of existing affordable housing units.42  
Conversely, Seattle has seen dramatic rent growth in recent years due 
to an increase in higher-earning residents and a lack of new units 
meeting that demand.43  Consequently, the city developed a plan that 
aims to build or preserve 50,000 units — 60% of that target focused on 
new market-rate construction, and the remaining 40% devoted either 
to the development or preservation of affordable units.44 
Both plans reference the preservation of private market units 
currently at affordable rent levels, and the preservation of existing 
subsidized housing either at risk of subsidy expiration or in need of 
repair.  In Philadelphia’s case, the plan explicitly mentions the nearly 
14,500 units of existing subsidized housing that may need support 
before the year 2030,45 whereas the Seattle plan does not specifically 
mention this portfolio.46  Regardless of how explicitly cities and states 
address this problem, research shows that the number of units in need 
of preservation far exceeds the number of affordable housing units 
being created.47  The loss of existing affordable units is central to 
housing advocates’ call for mandating all properties receiving any 
form of local or federal subsidy — either during the development 
 
 41. See ALLISON ALBEE ET AL., CHANGELAB SOLS., PRESERVING, PROTECTING, 
AND EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 18–30 (2015), 
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Preserving-affordable-housing-policy-tools-April-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2LQ-732U]; Press Release, Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation, Protect, Preserve and Produce: A Landmark Housing Partnership 
Arrives in the Bay Area (Jan. 24, 2019), http://www.lisc.org/our-stories/story/protect-
preserve-produce-landmark-housing-partnership-arrives-bay-area 
[https://perma.cc/DT5S-CH9G]. 
 42. CITY OF PHILA., HOUSING FOR EQUITY, supra note 30, at 5. 
 43. Mike Rosenberg, After Brief Slowdown, Seattle-Area Rents Surge Back Up 
Again; When Will It End?, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/after-brief-slowdown-seattle-area-
rents-surge-back-up-again-when-will-it-end/ [https://perma.cc/SS3V-XG2U]. 
 44. CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE: A ROADMAP TO AN AFFORDABLE AND 
LIVABLE CITY 2 (2015) [hereinafter CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE], 
https://murray.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/HALA_ActionPlan_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3BV5-CXN9]. 
 45. CITY OF PHILA, FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 32, at 8. 
 46. See CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE, supra note 44. 
 47. Reina, supra note 33, at 4. 
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process or in the course of operating the property — become 
permanently affordable. 
III. DEFINING PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY 
Before exploring the concept of permanent affordability, it is 
important to establish the nature of affordability restrictions on 
housing developments.  The federal government rolled out a series of 
programs that provided subsidies to private owners, in exchange for 
owners keeping a certain share of units in the development affordable 
for a fixed period after the creation of HUD in 1965.48  The number 
of units required to be affordable, the level of affordability, and the 
length of the affordability restrictions vary by program.49  This model 
— the disposition of public subsidies to private owners, conditioned 
on the development and management of subsidized affordable 
housing for a fixed period — has become the primary model 
employed by federal, state, and local subsidized housing programs.50  
Municipalities increasingly view this as a model for developing new 
loan and grant programs in their attempt to incentivize owners of 
existing private market affordable housing to preserve the stock of 
privately-owned affordable housing.51 
When most federal subsidized housing programs were created 
during the 1960s through the 1980s, U.S. cities were suffering from 
decline or disinvestment.52  As a result, the structure of these 
 
 48. See BEGLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 9, 20; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 
203–23. 
 49. See supra note 48. 
 50. For example, the federally funded and state administered Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) is the “single largest subsidy for the 
production of low-income rental housing.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 135. Under 
the program, state agencies award tax credits to investors for low-income rental 
developments. Id. At the local level, increasingly popular inclusionary zoning 
programs reward developers for producing affordable units with height, density, or 
other bonuses. See Jenny Schuetz et al., Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse? The Effects of 
Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets in the United States, 48 URB. STUD. 
297, 298 (2011), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098009360683 
[https://perma.cc/9W55-EBP9]. 
 51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ginsburg, Enterprise and HPD Launch Landlord 
Ambassadors Program to Preserve Affordable Housing Through Community 
Engagement, ENTERPRISE (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/new-york-landlord-ambassadors-program 
[https://perma.cc/2Z2S-PCVL]. 
 52. See George Sternlieb & James Hughes, The Uncertain Future of the Central 
City, 18 URB. AFF. Q. 455, 458 (1983); see also Edward Glaeser & Jesse Shapiro, Is 
There a New Urbanism? The Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8357, 2001) (finding that, with the exceptions of 
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programs reflected the government’s desire to maximize the number 
of affordable units developed, the length of affordability of the units, 
and the number of developers engaged in the production of such 
units.  The Mitchell-Lama program, a middle-income housing 
program in New York City, best exemplifies this desire.53  The 
Mitchell-Lama program required a 35-year affordability restriction 
when it was created in 1955 by the State of New York.  The length of 
this affordability requirement resulted in low participation rates.54  
The 35-year affordability restriction was subsequently reduced to 15 
years in 1959, and then increased to 20 years in 1960.55  The reduction 
in the affordability term subsequently increased participation in the 
program.56  The federal LIHTC program57 is another federal subsidy 
program that subsidizes developers to provide affordable housing.58  
Created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program 
initially only required a 15-year affordability commitment.59  Three 
years later, in 1989, the restriction period was increased to 30 years.60  
In many states where the allocation of these credits is highly 
competitive, the affordability restriction period can be as long as 60 
years.61 
An important feature of the affordability restrictions in every 
subsidized housing program, except for public housing, is the 
expiration of the affordability period.  In some cases, the affordability 
restriction period is coterminous with the subsidy period, and the 
 
Milwaukee in the 1950s and Columbus in the 1970s, “in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, 
almost every Northeastern or Midwestern city with more than 500,000 people shrank 
in every decade”). 
 53. Mitchell-Lama, NYC HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/mitchell-lama.page [https://perma.cc/EY8V-
THUR] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
 54. History, MITCHELL-LAMA RESIDENTS COALITION, http://www.mitchell-
lama.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/7PBY-CJAU] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax 
System, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-
and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/K8D8-XHPS] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 58. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 135–59. 
 59. Id. at 135, 150. 
 60. Id. at 151. 
 61. See JEREMY GUSTAFSON & J. CHRISTOPHER WALKER, URB. INST., ANALYSIS 
OF STATE QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS FOR THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT PROGRAM 18–19 (2002). By 2001, 41 states either required or favored 
projects with affordability periods of 40 to 60 years, and some have incentivized 
perpetual affordability, as in the case of Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont. Id. 
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owner has the option to renew their subsidy and affordability 
commitment at the same time.62  When a contract expires, an owner 
can re-commit to a new, limited period contract, during which they 
continue to receive their subsidy.63  Thus, the owner continues to 
receive the financial benefit of the subsidy in exchange for prolonged 
affordability.  However, in other programs, such as the LIHTC 
program, there is no ability to renew the subsidy without reapplying 
for it directly.64 
Not all owners who reach the end of their affordability restriction 
period exit the subsidy programs.65  However, the expiration of a 
development’s affordability requirements is a distinct point at which 
some owners opt to leave subsidy programs.66  Property owners in 
areas where the local housing values are appreciating are more likely 
to exit subsidy programs.67  Furthermore, owners are more likely to 
exit subsidy programs where properties are located in areas where 
residential economic opportunities are increasing, housing 
affordability is declining, and the ability to profitably develop new 
affordable units is diminishing.68  But, evidence shows that the 
development of subsidized housing increases property values in 
 
 62. This is true in the project-based Section 8 program. See Section 8 Program 
Background Information, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/mfh/rfp/s8bkinfo 
[https://perma.cc/4BDB-PKXU] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See JILL KHADDURI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT 
HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND 
BEYOND? v–vi (2012), 
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/what_happens_lihtc_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9JT-QVYS]. 
 65. The decision to opt in or out is associated with property characteristics such as 
location, property type, size, and age, and the type and level of assistance. See 
MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., MULTIFAMILY 
PROPERTIES: OPTING IN, OPTING OUT, AND REMAINING AFFORDABLE 67–69 (2006), 
https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/pdf/opting_in.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4SZ-
6VMH]. 
 66. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at xii–xvii, 61–71. 
 67. See Vincent Reina & Jaclene Begley, Will They Stay or Will They Go: 
Predicting Subsidized Housing Opt-Outs, 23 J. HOUSING ECON. 1, 11 (2014). “[A] one 
unit . . . increase in the percent change in neighborhood property appreciation over 
the past five years increases the hazard rate of opt out by 242%.” Id. at 9. 
 68. See Michael C. Lens & Vincent Reina, Preserving Neighborhood 
Opportunity: Where Federal Housing Subsidies Expire, 26 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
714, 727 (2016). Housing projects subsidized through HUD’s project-based Section 8 
program and due to expire between 2011 and 2020 are located in higher-opportunity 
neighborhoods than the average unit leased with a housing voucher. Id. at 728. 
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distressed neighborhoods.69  This means that in many cases, public 
investments in subsidized affordable housing help revitalize 
neighborhoods, but these units are often converted to market rate 
once these areas become opportunity neighborhoods.70  As a result, 
housing advocates push for permanent affordability mandates on all 
properties receiving a public subsidy.71 
There is no set definition for what constitutes permanent 
affordability.  The general premise of permanent affordability is that 
a public entity, not a private owner, decides when the affordability 
restrictions on a property expire.72  Thus, if a public entity decides a 
development cannot terminate its affordability requirements, then it 
is effectively affordable in perpetuity.  Emily Thaden captures the 
concept well: 
Permanently Affordable Housing . . . refers to all types of housing 
with lasting affordability . . . . [d]iffering from the shorter 
affordability periods required by federal programs to support the 
production of affordable housing, these maintain the affordability of 
housing over the long-term in order to preserve the affordable 
housing stock and the public’s investment in affordable housing 
production.73 
This definition suggests a system that could be similar to rent 
control, but also quite different, depending on interpretation.  Similar 
 
 69. Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress 
Neighborhood Property Values?, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 257, 257 (2007). 
 70. The concept of “neighborhood opportunity” is based on the idea that 
neighborhood characteristics play a significant role in the life outcomes of the people 
who live in them. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Margery Turner, Does Neighborhood 
Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 833, 833 (1997). 
“Opportunity neighborhoods” are therefore neighborhoods in which the social and 
economic environment favors positive life outcomes such as educational attainment, 
employment, and income mobility. See Lens & Reina, supra note 68, at 716–18. 
 71. See Dulchin, supra note 5, at 1. Note that the Association for Neighborhood 
and Housing Development (ANHD) has been campaigning for permanent 
affordability for at least a decade. See generally KELLY ANNE JOHNSTONE, ASS’N FOR 
NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY: A NATIONAL 
CONVERSATION (2009), https://anhd.org/report/permanent-affordability-national-
conversation-0 [https://perma.cc/6ML7-D4CH]. 
 72. See CHERYL CORT, COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, LONG-TERM HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 17 (2017), 
https://www.smartergrowth.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/LongTermAffordability_FINAL_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FBG8-MZ3L]. 
 73. Emily Thaden, Permanently Affordable Housing: Sector Chart & Glossary of 
Terms, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TR. NETWORK (2015), http://cltnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Permanently-Affordable-Housing-Sector-Chart-Glossary-
11-2014-design-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7TS-5NGF]. 
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to rent control, a permanent affordability mandate could mean that 
rents must not increase by more than a certain share in any given 
year.74  Alternatively, it could mean that rent levels must remain 
lower than the median or mean rent for an area.  The third option — 
and most common interpretation75 — is that permanent affordability 
requires rent to be set at a level which is affordable for households 
earning a predetermined share of the area median income.76  Under 
this third scenario, permanent affordability is a concept distinct from 
rent control because it is a requirement to rent units to low-income 
households, ensuring they spend no more than 30% of their income 
on rent.  A clear theme across all of these definitions of permanent 
affordability is that rents are restricted in perpetuity, and any 
determination beyond that will likely reflect the local affordability 
problem.  The resources and political will to address this problem will 
occur through such mandates. 
IV. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF PERMANENT 
AFFORDABILITY 
There are potential opportunities and challenges of permanent 
affordability mandates, and these tradeoffs vary across time and 
markets.77  There are several main arguments in favor of permanent 
affordability mandates.  First, preservation of affordable housing 
costs less than the construction of new housing, and therefore should 
be prioritized.78  Next, permanent affordability mandates reduce the 
 
 74. See, e.g., TIMOTHY COLLINS, NYC RENT GUIDELINES BD., AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE NYC RENT GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 89 
(2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/history/intro.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5ZYV-7EPB]. 
 75. See, e.g., Nico Calvita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California: 
The Experience of Two Decades, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 150, 151 (1998); Robert 
Hickey et al., Achieving Lasting Affordability through Inclusionary Housing 7–9 
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. 14RH1, 2014); CORT, supra note 72, 
at 7. 
 76. For example, households in project-based Section 8 developments must have 
incomes below 80% of area median income. See Policy Basics: Section 8 Project-
Based Rental Assistance, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-section-8-project-based-rental-
assistance [https://perma.cc/HJY8-52PU]. While 80% of area median income is the 
maximum allowed income for residents of Section 8 project-based rentals, the 
program further requires that at least 40% of units are available to those households 
making below 30% of area median income. Id. 
 77. This is a difficulty inherent in developing any universal policy. 
 78. See Charles Wilkins et al., Comparing the Life-Cycle Costs of New 
Construction and Acquisition-Rehab of Affordable Multifamily Rental Housing, 25 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 684, 708 (2015). 
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gaming of subsidy systems and the administrative costs associated 
with the existing preservation process.79  In addition, these mandates 
increase household stability and protect, or potentially increase, 
access to opportunity neighborhoods.80  Lastly, they shield existing 
subsidized affordable housing from the federal government’s shifting 
political priorities.81 
Conversely, such mandates could result in several negative 
outcomes, including: increasing initial development costs and 
reducing the number of units being produced; decreasing 
participation in existing subsidized housing programs; negatively 
affecting where new subsidized housing units are created; creating 
future obligations that exacerbate the tradeoffs between allocating 
funds to preservation versus new construction; and increasing 
monitoring costs.82  Ultimately, while permanent affordability can 
preserve the affordability of a unit, it does not guarantee the 
households in those units will not be rent burdened.83 
The list of opportunities and challenges discussed in this section 
highlight the complexity of permanent affordability mandates.  
However, these potential adverse outcomes do not negate the value 
of permanent affordability as a policy that municipalities should 
consider and possibly pursue. 
A. The Potential of Permanent Affordability Mandates 
One of the primary cases made in support of permanent 
affordability is the reduced cost associated with maintaining the 
affordability of existing housing units84 — namely, that the per-unit 
cost of preserving an existing property as affordable is often less than 
the cost of developing a new affordable unit. 85  In the short term, the 
 
 79. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 6. 
 80. See infra notes 97–104. 
 81. See infra notes 105–07. 
 82. See infra notes 108–24. 
 83. See infra notes 125–128. 
 84. For example, HUD argues that “preserving existing affordable rental housing 
offers many advantages,” and cites as first among these that “the nation’s stock of 
government-subsidized affordable rentals represents a taxpayer-funded investment 
worth billions of dollars” that would cost much less to preserve than rebuild. 
Preserving Affordable Rental Housing: A Snapshot of Growing Need, Current 
Threats, and Innovative Solutions, OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES. (2013), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer13/highlight1.html#title 
[https://perma.cc/8HFP-MJD9]. 
 85. One study finds that the life-cycle cost of producing new multifamily housing 
is 25–45% higher than the cost of acquiring and rehabilitating (i.e., preserving) an 
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preservation of existing affordable housing does not reduce existing 
rent burden levels but does help ensure that housing affordability 
problems do not worsen.86  In the long term, the preservation of 
existing affordable housing could potentially increase the number of 
affordable units because it reduces the number of units exiting the 
housing stock due to poor physical condition. 
Introducing a permanent affordability mandate makes it easier to 
preserve the affordability of an existing subsidized affordable 
property.  Currently, when affordability restrictions expire, owners of 
subsidized units can use their actual or potential market return to 
extract additional resources from public entities hoping to preserve 
the affordability of those units.87  This is true for owners of existing 
unsubsidized units with rents below the median for a particular 
market.88  Specifically, an owner of an existing subsidized affordable 
housing development has two options: (1) maintain his or her 
property as affordable housing with or without a subsidy or (2) have 
rents follow market demand.89  Thus, the owner is always deciding 
between affordability and the market.90  It is not only current market 
 
affordable multifamily property. See Reina, supra note 33, at 27; Wilkins et al., supra 
note 78, at 704–05. 
 86. Even residents LIHTC properties are frequently rent burdened. Preserving 
these properties does not reduce or eliminate these burdens; it merely maintains the 
existing level of affordability. See Anne Williamson, Can They Afford the Rent? 
Resident Cost Burden in Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments, 47 URB. 
AFF. REV. 755, 791 (2011). 
 87. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 48. The owners of LIHTC properties 
may seek additional tax credit allocations at the end of their contracts because it is 
profitable. Indeed, “a number of development firms have embraced resyndication 
and rehabilitation of older affordable properties as a business model.” Id. at 55. 
 88. Atticus Jaramillo, NOAH: Everything You Need to Know, CAROLINA PLAN. 
J. (April 7, 2017), https://carolinaangles.com/2017/04/07/noah-everything-you-need-
to-know/ [https://perma.cc/EE5V-ZZNJ]. For example, an affordably priced 698-unit 
apartment complex in Richfield, Minnesota was sold in 2015, and the new owner 
raised rents and instituted new lease-up requirements, resulting in the displacement 
of about 80% of the residents. Id. This event, on its own, offset nearly all the 
production of new affordable housing in the Twin Cities metro area that had 
occurred the preceding year. Id. The risk of losing so-called “naturally occurring 
affordable housing,” or NOAH, has motivated government and nonprofit entities to 
create preservation strategies specifically for unsubsidized properties. Id. 
 89. For existing subsidized housing units this happens at the point where all 
affordability restrictions on the property expire, whereas for unsubsidized property 
this can happen at the end of a lease in the case of increasing rent or at any point in 
the case of a property sale. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 2. 
 90. In the case of existing subsidized housing, the Association of Neighborhood 
and Housing Development describes this choice as being between “the value of 
cashing out and going to market, versus the value the government will provide him or 
her to keep the property affordable.” See DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 8. Evidence 
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values that affect an owner’s decision to exit a subsidy program, but 
also the anticipated growth in values.91  Public officials must either 
negotiate with owners seeking to exit an affordability program or risk 
losing subsidized affordable units.  Indeed, there is an economic 
incentive for owners who are interested in maintaining the 
affordability of their properties to pretend otherwise in order to 
extract resources from a public entity.  A permanent affordability 
restriction limits an owner’s negotiating power.  If a property has a 
permanent affordability restriction, then its owner must keep the unit 
affordable, and thus has less leverage when negotiating with a public 
entity for resources.  Under the permanent affordability scenario, the 
owner is only able to negotiate subsidies based on the rehabilitation 
costs needed to maintain the property, as opposed to potential sales 
prices or rent potential.  As a result, the public cost of preserving 
affordability falls. 
Permanent affordability mandates also reduce the administrative 
costs of preserving affordable and subsidized housing.  Research on 
preserving affordable housing highlights the need for coalitions of 
advocates, developers, residents, and government officials to work 
together and use data to proactively determine where rents are likely 
to increase, or subsidies will expire.92  Further, current research also 
emphasizes that these partnerships between stakeholders, advocates, 
tenants, and the government take time to develop and require 
considerable resources to be sustained.93  Ultimately, a permanent 
affordability restriction reduces some of this complexity surrounding 
the preservation of low-cost housing.  First, less advocacy and 
organizing is needed to pressure owners to keep properties affordable 
if they are required to do so.94  Further, much of the cost of litigating 
preservation will be eliminated if there is a clear mandate tied to 
affordability.95  While there will still be litigation from owners looking 
 
shows that this calculation is likely different for nonprofit owners because of their 
social mission, but for all other owners that is not the case. See Reina & Begley, 
supra note 67, at 7. 
 91. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 7. Properties located in neighborhoods 
with high property value growth and for-profit owners are more likely to opt out of 
the Mitchell-Lama program. Id. 
 92. Kathryn Howell et al., One Size Fits None: Local Context and Planning for 
the Preservation of Affordable Housing, 29 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 148, 162 (2019). 
 93. Kathryn Howell, Neighborhoods, Local Networks and the Non-Linear Path of 
the Expiration and Preservation of Federal Rental Subsidies, 55 URB. STUD. 3092, 
3107 (2018). 
 94. See DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 8. 
 95. Currently, organizers and residents litigate to preserve affordable housing 
from owner opt-outs by intervening in federal foreclosure proceedings to promote 
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to exit affordability restrictions, a permanent affordability mandate 
reduces these instances and consequently reduces the current cost to 
the public of preservation.96 
A permanent affordability mandate could also increase housing 
stability and neighborhood access.97  While it remains unclear 
whether neighborhood improvement leads to direct displacement, 
even households not displaced from an appreciating neighborhood 
can be forced into a sub-optimal living situation in order to maintain 
access to that neighborhood.98  Preservation can be a bulwark against 
potential displacement.  In addition, many existing affordable units, 
and particularly older subsidized housing units, are currently located 
in higher-opportunity neighborhoods.99  These older subsidized 
housing units are more likely to have reached, or be on the verge of 
approaching, the end of their affordability restriction period.100  
Finally, households living in properties where a subsidy has expired 
have a higher propensity to move due to said subsidy expiration.101  In 
 
preservation sales; enforcing the prepayment restrictions in federal mortgages; 
participating in bankruptcy proceedings to preserve project subsidies; using state law 
to preserve state-subsidized projects; and enforcing the city’s right-to-purchase 
legislation. See Ellen Davidson & Ed Josephson, Preserving New York’s Subsidized 
Housing Through Litigation, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 437, 438 (2009). 
 96. Developers have challenged inclusionary housing mandates on the basis that 
they violate the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and could mount 
similar challenges against permanent affordability restrictions. See Richard A. 
Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, in EVIDENCE 
& INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAND AND POLICY 64, 66 (Lee Anne Fennell & 
Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017). 
 97. There is a large body of literature addressing neighborhood change and its 
relationship with displacement. For a thorough review of this literature, see Ingrid 
Gould Ellen & Katherine M. O’Regan, How Low-Income Neighborhoods Change: 
Entry, Exit, and Enhancement, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 89, 90 (2011). 
 98. Kathe Newman and Elvin Wyly found that households in gentrifying 
neighborhoods who remained in that neighborhood were more likely to double up, 
pay a higher share of their income in rent, or live in sub-optimal housing. See Kathe 
Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and 
Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23, 48–49 (2006). 
 99. Lens & Reina, supra note 68, at 727. 
 100. LIHTC properties completed before 1989 were subject to a 15-year 
affordability restriction, while later-year buildings must maintain their affordability 
for 30 years. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 151. HUD-subsidized properties have 
varying affordability periods, typically 20 to 40 years. See id. at 203–11. Since many 
subsidy programs for privately-owned rental housing were created in the 1960s and 
1970s, some older properties have already reached the ends of these periods. Id. 
 101. See Vincent Reina, The Impact of Mobility and Government Rental Subsidies 
on the Welfare of Households and Affordability of Markets 41–64 (Aug. 9, 2016) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of S. Cal.), 
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll40/id/281192 
[https://perma.cc/9JXB-4CZJ]. 
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some circumstances where an existing place-based subsidy expires, 
households are eligible for a voucher as a form of safety net to 
prevent a household from displacement.102  Those who can use the 
voucher tend to move to slightly lower-poverty neighborhoods.103  
However, less than 50% of those households eligible for the voucher 
succeed in using it, despite the high level of demand.104  An 
affordability mandate on a property would likely reduce the odds of 
displacement from a housing unit.  Such a mandate may also allow a 
household to remain in neighborhoods that have improved or are 
improving because it shields that household from rent increases (and 
the threat thereof).  As a result, mandating permanent affordability 
could ensure low-income households are not displaced, regardless of 
whether the housing is subsidized, and ensure households can remain 
in a neighborhood as it improves. 
Finally, an essential feature of a permanent affordability mandate 
is its ability to protect existing affordable housing from national 
policy shifts which reduce support for affordable housing.  In 2018, 
the federal government suspended most of its operations due to an 
impasse on the federal debt limit extension, which affected the federal 
government’s ability to honor some of its subsidy payments.105  This 
occurred amid budget proposals that would reduce or eliminate 
funding for many subsidized housing programs.106  Such events serve 
to reduce confidence in the government’s commitment to providing 
housing subsidies, and could negatively affect an owner’s desire to 
remain in a subsidized housing program.107  As a result, it is likely that 
when allowed to opt out, a distrustful owner would rationally do so.  
 
 102. Vincent Reina & Ben Winter, Safety Net? The Use of Vouchers When a 
Place-Based Rental Subsidy Ends, 56 URB. STUD. 2092, 2093 (2019). 
 103. Id. at 2103. 
 104. Id. at 2094. 
 105. Suzy Khimm & Laura Strickler, Because of the Shutdown, More Than 1,000 
Affordable Housing Contracts Have Expired, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/because-shutdown-more-1-000-
affordable-housing-contracts-have-expired-n955971 [https://perma.cc/F6X7-AQGF]. 
 106. President Trump Proposes Drastic Cuts to Affordable Housing Programs, 
NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://nlihc.org/resource/president-trump-proposes-drastic-cuts-affordable-housing-
programs [https://perma.cc/M4EY-RMXZ]. President Trump’s proposed budget 
would have eliminated or greatly reduced funding to programs such as the Housing 
Trust Fund, the HOME Investment Partnership program, and public housing capital 
repair. Id. 
 107. See Amanda Abrams, The Government Shutdown Put Thousands at Risk for 
Eviction: Officials Worried About Loss of Trust, YES! MAG. (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/trust-in-hud-public-housing-at-stake-over-
looming-government-shutdown-20190212 [https://perma.cc/5CWW-37DN]. 
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A permanent affordability restriction would limit an owner’s ability to 
make this choice, preserving the unit’s affordability amid such shifts 
in federal affordable housing subsidies. 
B. Challenges and Unintended Consequences of Mandating 
Permanent Affordability 
While many of these features of affordability mandates seem 
desirable, they do not come without costs.  One main argument made 
against a permanent affordability mandate is that it could decrease 
the number of affordable housing units being developed, as well as 
the pool of owners willing to enter affordability agreements.108  There 
is a constant tension between the desire to promote housing 
affordability with incentives and mandates, and ensuring that those 
incentives and mandates do not affect developers’ and owners’ 
willingness to engage in programs.  This debate is reflected in the 
creation of inclusionary zoning policies.  Inclusionary zoning uses a 
mixture of incentives and mandates to leverage existing market-rate 
development to increase the supply, and diversify the location, of 
affordable housing.109  There are a myriad of inclusionary housing 
programs, and ultimately much uncertainty about the net impact of 
these policies on housing production and affordability.110 
Like inclusionary zoning, a permanent affordability restriction 
could have two effects on an owner’s decision-making.  First, this 
restriction could reduce the likelihood of an owner engaging in an 
affordable housing program at all because it reduces an owner’s long-
term return on their investment.111  A permanent mandate restricts 
 
 108. For arguments against perpetual affordability restrictions in inclusionary 
zoning programs, see generally NAT’L ASS’N HOME BUILDERS, INCLUSIONARY 
ZONING PRIMER (2015), 
https://www.nahb.org/~/media/Sites/NAHB/Research/Priorities/September-2015-
Updated-NAHB-Inclusionary-Zoning-Primer.ashx? [https://perma.cc/3857-CF7X]. 
 109. See generally Jenny Schuetz et al., 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning: 
Comparing Policies from San Francisco, Washington, DC, and Suburban Boston, 75 
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 441 (2009) (providing an overview of the variation in types of 
inclusionary zoning programs). 
 110. See Emily Thaden & Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United 
States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices 14–31 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working 
Paper No. WP17ET1, Sept. 2017). Thaden and Wang also review a broad set of 
inclusionary zoning programs. Id. While they point to the number of units developed, 
this estimate does not subtract the counterfactual, that is, the number of units that 
would have been developed had these programs not existed. Id. at 31. As a result, the 
large number of units developed are a sign of success, but it is not clear that a lower 
number of units would have been developed absent the policy. Id. at 58. 
 111. For a description of the financial considerations facing developers subject to 
affordable housing restrictions, see Rachel Bratt, Affordable Rental Housing 
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rents for a more extended period of time and raises the risk 
associated with the future sale of the property.112  A future purchaser 
would be required to maintain the affordability of the property.113  
Moreover, in some instances, a purchaser may even need to be 
approved by a public entity, thus reducing the sales price and 
potential pool of purchasers.114  In addition, an owner who knows 
they need to keep their property below market rate will likely face 
higher upfront capital costs in order to establish the reserves required 
to maintain the property over time.115  This capital requirement 
increases the initial development or preservation cost of a property 
with a permanent affordability mandate.116  Together, these two 
factors reduce the return on developing or preserving affordable 
housing, absent a subsidy accounting for that difference.  The lower 
return could then reduce the number of actors engaging in affordable 
housing development and preservation, thus negatively impacting the 
actual number of units developed and preserved overall. 
A second potential consequence of permanent affordability 
mandates is the potential effect on the location of affordable housing.  
Owners in high appreciation areas are less likely to commit to 
restricting rent levels absent a subsidy that matches or exceeds the 
 
Development in the U.S. For-Profit Sector: Implications of a Case Study of 
McCormack Baron Salazar, 28 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489 (2018). 
 112. See id. at 496–97. The developer in the case study sold 19% of its subsidized 
properties at year 15, sometimes because the combination of restricted rents and the 
lack of additional public resources made it impossible to reposition the assets for 
another 15 years such that they would remain financially viable. Id. 
 113. Affordability restrictions, until they expire, are passed onto subsequent 
purchasers. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 51–52. 
 114. The existing pool of affordable housing developers is already limited by rising 
development costs, limited returns, and cuts to government subsidy programs. See 
Gabriella Chiarenza, Challenges for Affordable Housing in a New Era of Scarcity, 25 
COMMUNITY INV. 2, 3 (2013). 
 115. See CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE HOUS., CAPITALIZED RENTAL SUBSIDY 
RESERVES: CONCEPT SUMMARY 1 (2006), https://www.csh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/CapitalizedReservepdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/43MV-XER2]. 
Affordable housing developers create reserve funds to insure against unforeseen 
costs and to protect the project’s long-term viability. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, A 
GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING FUNDING SOURCES 11 (2008), 
https://www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/coah/resources/planresources/fundguide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W2BP-ZRXW]. Such funds must be greater if the project operates 
at reduced rents for an extended period of time. Id. These funds are often capitalized 
into the project’s development budget, thus raising the initial cost of development. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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expected return on the market.117  Consequently, a permanent 
affordability mandate could reduce the development and preservation 
of existing affordable and/or subsidized units in high-cost or high-
appreciation markets.  However, owners may be willing to accept a 
subsidy in exchange for a commitment to permanent affordability if 
their properties are located in areas where there is greater uncertainty 
about future appreciation.  A permanent affordability mandate could 
push development and preservation away from higher-opportunity 
areas, or areas that are improving, to exclusively declining, stagnant, 
or uncertain markets. 
A primary concern with a permanent affordability mandate is the 
likelihood that impacted properties will need subsidies at a later point 
in order to meet that mandate, thus creating an ongoing pipeline of 
properties needing public subsidies.  Every property, even those 
capitalized with significant reserves during its initial financing, will 
eventually need to be rehabilitated, and the cost of those future 
repairs are difficult to predict.  The reduced rent levels mandated by 
an affordability restriction reduce the amount of debt a property can 
carry.  This reduction in debt effectively limits the amount of capital 
that can be used to rehabilitate a property.118  Consequently, this 
would mean that properties subject to a permanent affordability 
mandate will likely need additional financing in the future to maintain 
the quality of units and meet this mandate.  This quandary creates a 
set pool of properties that will need reoccuring subsidies over time.  
Furthermore, some properties will need additional public resources to 
remain viable subsidized affordable housing options and will be 
competing for the same resources being used to develop new units.119 
 
 117. Mitchell-Lama property owners, for example, were much less likely to 
recommit to affordability restrictions in areas experiencing above-average property 
value appreciation. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 6–7, 10. 
 118. Some developers use additional federal rental subsidy programs, such as 
Section 8 rental assistance, to ensure they can both meet their affordability goals and 
maintain higher rent levels to attract the capital required to maintain their property. 
Section 8 rental assistance, either through the project-based Section 8 or the voucher 
program, is a subsidy that covers the gap between the HUD approved rent for a unit 
and the tenant rent payment. The tenant rent payment is set at 30% of household 
income. As a result, the subsidy allows an owner to attract capital based on market 
rents, but ensures tenants are not rent burdened. The demand for Section 8 subsidies 
exceeds the supply, which means not all properties can benefit from this resource. 
For more details on the programs and subsidy layering, see Vincent Reina & Michael 
Williams, The Importance of Using Layered Data to Analyze Housing: The Case of 
the Subsidized Housing Information Project, 14 CITYSCAPE 215 (2012). For more 
details on the high demand for Section 8 subsidies, see Landis & Reina, supra note 
12, at 12, 15–16. 
 119. Reina, supra note 33, at 4. 
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Ultimately, in many years going forward there will be more 
subsidized housing units in need of preservation than the annual 
average number of units developed through the LIHTC.120  In New 
York City, for example, nearly 60% of the existing LIHTC units that 
needed reposition between 2008 and 2015 required additional forms 
of public investment.121  While the cost per unit was well below that of 
new construction, this still reflects an increasing commitment of 
public resources to the preservation of existing affordable housing, 
which could come at the cost of subsidizing new developments.122 
A final challenge with a permanent affordability mandate is the 
required additional monitoring of units.  The monitoring of units 
comes in two primary forms: ensuring low-income households are 
renting them and ensuring housing quality standards are met.123  
Adequate monitoring is essential to the success of long-term 
affordability mandates, and necessitates a public investment in the 
capacity of public agencies to monitor the affordability of these 
properties.124 
Finally, one item that is both an opportunity and a challenge of 
permanent affordability is the mandated level of affordability.  It is 
expensive to develop affordable housing for the lowest income 
households.125  Accordingly, even some of the units developed 
 
 120. Id. at Figure 1 at 4. 
 121. DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 9. 
 122. The cost of preserving affordable units is well below that of constructing new 
ones. See Wilkins et al., supra note 78, at 707–08. But the costs of preservation can 
still be so high as to impede new construction. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 211. 
For example, the cost of renewing Section 8 contracts, even when renewed for very 
short periods, “escalated nearly to the point of absorbing HUD’s entire budget” in 
the 2000s. Id. 
 123. See, for example, the Washington D.C. Department of Housing and 
Community Development’s project monitoring functions. Department of Housing 
and Community Development, DC.GOV, https://dhcd.dc.gov/service/project-
monitoring [https://perma.cc/EW6J-WAQS] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). The 
department conducts two primary types of oversight of projects developed through 
federal and local subsidy programs: quality assurance and compliance monitoring. Id. 
 124. Alex Schwartz & Edwin Melendez, After Year 15: Challenges to the 
Preservation of Housing Financed with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 9 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 261, 262, 289 (2008). “[Many states] have yet to devise 
systems to monitor long-term compliance with [affordability] requirements or 
sanctions in the event of violation.” Id. at 262. 
 125. See ANDREW JAKABOVICS ET AL., URB. LAND INST., BENDING THE COST 
CURVE: SOLUTIONS TO EXPAND THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE RENTALS 8–9 (2014). 
Housing development costs are driven by “site constraints, design elements, local 
land use and zoning restrictions, building codes, [and] delays in the development 
process.” Id. at 8. In the case of deeply affordable housing, costs are increased by 
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through the LIHTC program, the primary tool for developing new 
subsidized affordable housing units, are often only affordable at 50% 
or 60% of area median income.126  As a result, many households 
earning less than that amount live in a subsidized unit but are still rent 
burdened.127  On the other hand, because of HUD’s ongoing rental 
support, households in project-based Section 8 developments are 
guaranteed that their rent will not exceed 30% of their income.128  In 
both cases, a permanent affordability restriction would ensure the 
preservation of an affordable unit, but only in one of the cases would 
it ensure that households are not rent burdened. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Ten years ago, nearly every economist argued that rent control was 
an inefficient policy because it reduced the supply of housing.129  
However, given today’s affordability challenges, at least one well-
regarded economist has argued that every tool needs to be on the 
table, and policies like rent control may be important for increasing 
the stock of affordable housing in some settings and for certain 
periods of time.130  Like rent control, permanent affordability 
deserves reconsideration.  For instance, when the Mitchell-Lama 
program was created, mandating longer affordability commitment 
periods was challenging.131  Today, however, developers are actively 
competing for subsidies with affordability restriction periods — 
 
subsidy program regulations and by the services and amenities necessary to improve 
the lives of very low-income households. Id. at 18–20. 
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TENANTS? 3–4 (2012), 
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 128. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 207, 222. 
 129. See generally Blair Jenkins, Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?, 6 ECON. J. 
WATCH 73 (2009). For a review of rent control literature, see LISA STURTEVANT, 
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CONTROL: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 10–12 (2018), 
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Housing, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
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 131. See MITCHELL-LAMA RESIDENTS COALITION, supra note 54. 
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sometimes more than 60 years.132  While 60 years is not perpetuity, a 
60-year long restriction period may pose the same negative 
development incentives of a permanent affordability mandate.  So, 
how can one determine when the clear long-term benefits of a 
permanent affordability mandate outweigh the potential challenges? 
One solution is that municipalities can estimate the option value 
associated with a permanent affordability mandate.  Essentially, how 
much is a government willing to pay now to preserve the affordability 
of a unit in the future?  Or, how much is the government willing to 
pay in order to maintain the option to decide the best use of the land 
that the property is developed on, which could or could not be deemd 
to be for affordable housing? This payment can come in different 
forms.  First, it can be a direct public subsidy which increases the rate 
of return, or one which increases the security of the return, for 
developers who agree to such a restriction.  For example, the 
permanent affordability mandate might be accompanied by a subsidy 
which allows for a higher initial developer fee that is extracted at the 
time of financing, or it could subsidize deeper reserves to ensure the 
long-term viability of property, offering a moderate return.133  
Municipalities should acknowledge that zoning variances, tax 
abatements and land given to developers for free or at below market 
prices, are also significant subsidies.  They should also acknowledge 
that when we consider these forms of public supports as “subsidies,” 
the public actually subsidizes a larger share of housing development 
than just those units with federal rental subsidies. Further, in 
instances where a city gives a developer land — land that will not be 
returned to the city — the future value of the land should be 
considered when evaluating the appropriateness of long-term 
affordability mandates. 
A future value calculation of a permanent affordability mandate 
could also vary based on where units are being developed.  For 
 
 132. For instance, New York City’s 9% LIHTC deals come with an affordability 
restriction of 60 years, yet it remains highly competitive. Press Release, N.Y.C. 
Housing  Preservation & Dev., HPD Announces the Award of $18.1 Million in Tax 
Credits to Create Nearly 1,000 Affordable Homes Across the Five Boroughs (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/press-releases/2018/12/hpd-
announces-the-award-of-tax-credits.page [https://perma.cc/9LSV-GY2Z]. 
 133. “Moderate” meaning something along the lines of the return on a bond. Long-
term government bonds have returned an average of 5.7% per year since 1926, 
compared with 10.1% per year for stocks. VISTA CAPITAL PARTNERS, THE OPTIMAL 
PORTFOLIO (2015), https://vistacp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Optimal-
Portfolio1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UZQ-GKX3]. 
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example, a municipality may see a higher value associated with the 
option of preserving future affordability in a neighborhood showing 
early signs of price appreciation because the chances of preserving or 
developing affordable housing on land in those areas my be less 
financially feasible in the future, as opposed to one that is still 
declining.  As a result, the municipality may be willing to offer a 
subsidy in exchange for a permanent affordability restriction in the 
former case, and offer a proportionately lower subsidy in exchange 
for a restriction in the latter case. 
Alternatively, a municipality could elect not to provide any subsidy 
to incentivize owners to commit to permanent affordability, taking on 
the risk of fewer units being developed but that those developed are 
permanently affordable.  In essence, municipalities may decide that 
future affordability expirations could offset current development 
levels, and that fewer units initially produced with longer restrictions 
will result in a larger supply of affordable housing in the long term.  
Regardless of the scenario, municipalities should consider the value 
of the future option of preservation and use that to guide their 
decisions around a permanent affordability mandate.  A universal 
program requiring properties to receive any subsidy to be 
permanently affordable may not be as efficient as one that varies 
based on current, and perceived future, market dynamics. 
CONCLUSION 
Ensuring there is an adequate supply of affordable housing in good 
condition for the lowest-income households is an important housing 
policy goal.  The need for such housing has become all the more 
important because most low-income households across the country 
face crippling housing cost burdens.  Even if there was a large-scale 
supply response to current demand for housing, significant subsidies 
would still be needed to alleviate the severe rent burdens that the 
lowest-income households face.  This lack of affordable housing 
places increased pressure on the limited resources the government 
has to supply affordable rental units.  As a result, advocates have 
called for more aggressive affordability requirements to accompany 
public subsidies for housing, with some suggesting permanent 
affordability mandates.  Permanent affordability mandates can be an 
important tool to ensure an adequate supply of affordable and 
suitable housing options, but this approach does not come without 
drawbacks. 
This Article highlights the complexity of mandating permanent 
affordability.  There are many potential benefits of placing 
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affordability restrictions on properties that are in perpetuity.  A 
primary reason for permanent affordability restrictions is the 
possibility for a cheaper long-term solution to ensure there is an 
adequate supply of affordable housing.  This approach could have the 
added benefit of ensuring that at least some of that supply is in 
improving or higher-opportunity neighborhoods.  Conversely, 
permanent affordability mandates could increase development costs 
and therefore reduce the number of affordable units being produced.  
Such mandates could also result in affordable units only being 
produced in areas experiencing no growth.  These conflicting 
potential outcomes suggest that permanent affordability mandates 
could improve housing affordability goals in some markets, and have 
the opposite effects in others. 
One clear takeaway is that policymakers should account for the 
current and future value and benefits of affordability restrictions 
when making approvals in the development process.  When there is 
public land, zoning variances, tax abatements, and actual dollars 
going into developments, the public sector has significantly more 
leverage in dictating the extent of such affordability mandates.  
However, government subsidies are competing with private market 
returns, which are based on investment risk and future values, and 
affordability mandates need to account for this.  In the end, there is 
no hard and fast rule about when to apply permanent affordability 
mandates to developments, but it is clear these mandates are a viable 
tool that should be used to advance housing affordability goals. 
